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d3f7aa7008
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d3f7aa7008 | |
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bbfaf2fc4d |
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@ -563,10 +563,14 @@ ntfy server, they all share the proxy's IP address.
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Relevant flags to consider:
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* `behind-proxy`: if set, ntfy will use the `proxy-forwarded-header` to identify visitors (default: `false`)
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* `proxy-forwarded-header`: the header to use to identify visitors (default: `X-Forwarded-For`)
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* `proxy-trusted-addresses`: a comma-separated list of IP addresses that are removed from the forwarded header
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to determine the real IP address (default: empty)
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* `behind-proxy` makes it so that the real visitor IP address is extracted from the header defined in `proxy-forwarded-header`.
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Without this, the remote address of the incoming connection is used (default: `false`).
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* `proxy-forwarded-header` is the header to use to identify visitors (default: `X-Forwarded-For`). It may be a single IP address (e.g. `1.2.3.4`),
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a comma-separated list of IP addresses (e.g. `1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8`), or an [RFC 7239](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7239)-style
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header (e.g. `for=1.2.3.4;by=proxy.example.com, for=5.6.7.8`).
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* `proxy-trusted-addresses` is a comma-separated list of IP addresses that are removed from the forwarded header
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to determine the real IP address. This is only useful if there are multiple proxies involved that add themselves to
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the forwarded header (default: empty).
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=== "/etc/ntfy/server.yml (behind a proxy)"
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``` yaml
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@ -578,7 +582,7 @@ Relevant flags to consider:
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behind-proxy: true
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```
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=== "/etc/ntfy/server.yml (with custom header)"
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=== "/etc/ntfy/server.yml (X-Client-IP header)"
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``` yaml
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# Tell ntfy to use "X-Client-IP" header to identify visitors for rate limiting
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#
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@ -589,6 +593,17 @@ Relevant flags to consider:
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proxy-forwarded-header: "X-Client-IP"
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```
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=== "/etc/ntfy/server.yml (Forwarded header)"
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``` yaml
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# Tell ntfy to use "Forwarded" header (RFC 7239) to identify visitors for rate limiting
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#
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# Example: If "Forwarded: for=1.2.3.4;by=proxy.example.com, for=9.9.9.9" is set,
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# the visitor IP will be 9.9.9.9.
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#
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behind-proxy: true
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proxy-forwarded-header: "Forwarded"
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```
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=== "/etc/ntfy/server.yml (multiple proxies)"
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``` yaml
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# Tell ntfy to use "X-Forwarded-For" header to identify visitors for rate limiting,
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@ -1433,6 +1433,12 @@ and the [ntfy Android app](https://github.com/binwiederhier/ntfy-android/release
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## Not released yet
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### ntfy server v2.13.0 (UNRELEASED)
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**Features:**
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* Support `X-Client-IP`, `X-Real-IP`, `Forwarded` headers for [rate limiting](config.md#ip-based-rate-limiting) via `proxy-forwarded-header` and `proxy-trusted-addresses` ([#1360](https://github.com/binwiederhier/ntfy/pull/1360)/[#1252](https://github.com/binwiederhier/ntfy/pull/1252), thanks to [@pixitha](https://github.com/pixitha))
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### ntfy Android app v1.16.1 (UNRELEASED)
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**Features:**
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@ -95,21 +95,23 @@
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# auth-default-access: "read-write"
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# auth-startup-queries:
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# If set, the X-Forwarded-For header (or whatever is configured) is used to determine the visitor IP address
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# instead of the remote address of the connection.
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# If set, the X-Forwarded-For header (or whatever is configured in proxy-forwarded-header) is used to determine
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# the visitor IP address instead of the remote address of the connection.
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#
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# WARNING: If you are behind a proxy, you must set this, otherwise all visitors are rate-limited
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# as if they are one.
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#
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# - behind-proxy defines whether the server is behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, traefik, ...)
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# - proxy-forwarded-header defines the header used to determine the visitor IP address. This defaults
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# to "X-Forwarded-For", but can be set to any other header, e.g. "X-Real-IP", "X-Client-IP", ...
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# - proxy-trusted-addrs defines a list of trusted IP addresses that are stripped out of the
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# forwarded header. This is useful if there are multiple trusted proxies involved.
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# - behind-proxy makes it so that the real visitor IP address is extracted from the header defined in
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# proxy-forwarded-header. Without this, the remote address of the incoming connection is used.
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# - proxy-forwarded-header is the header to use to identify visitors. It may be a single IP address (e.g. 1.2.3.4),
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# a comma-separated list of IP addresses (e.g. "1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8"), or an RFC 7239-style header (e.g. "for=1.2.3.4;by=proxy.example.com, for=5.6.7.8").
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# - proxy-trusted-addresses is a comma-separated list of IP addresses that are removed from the forwarded header
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# to determine the real IP address. This is only useful if there are multiple proxies involved that add themselves to
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# the forwarded header.
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#
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# behind-proxy: false
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# proxy-forwarded-header: "X-Forwarded-For"
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# proxy-trusted-addrs:
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# proxy-trusted-addresses:
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# If enabled, clients can attach files to notifications as attachments. Minimum settings to enable attachments
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# are "attachment-cache-dir" and "base-url".
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@ -146,7 +148,7 @@
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# - smtp-server-domain is the e-mail domain, e.g. ntfy.sh
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# - smtp-server-addr-prefix is an optional prefix for the e-mail addresses to prevent spam. If set to "ntfy-",
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# for instance, only e-mails to ntfy-$topic@ntfy.sh will be accepted. If this is not set, all emails to
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# $topic@ntfy.sh will be accepted (which may obviously be a spam problem).
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# $topic@ntfy.sh will be accepted (which may be a spam problem).
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#
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# smtp-server-listen:
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# smtp-server-domain:
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@ -2244,6 +2244,20 @@ func TestServer_Visitor_Custom_ClientIP_Header(t *testing.T) {
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require.Equal(t, "1.2.3.4", v.ip.String())
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}
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func TestServer_Visitor_Custom_Forwarded_Header(t *testing.T) {
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c := newTestConfig(t)
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c.BehindProxy = true
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c.ProxyForwardedHeader = "Forwarded"
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c.ProxyTrustedAddresses = []string{"1.2.3.4"}
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s := newTestServer(t, c)
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r, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "/bla", nil)
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r.RemoteAddr = "8.9.10.11:1234"
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r.Header.Set("Forwarded", " for=5.6.7.8, by=example.com;for=1.2.3.4")
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v, err := s.maybeAuthenticate(r)
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require.Nil(t, err)
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require.Equal(t, "5.6.7.8", v.ip.String())
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}
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func TestServer_PublishWhileUpdatingStatsWithLotsOfMessages(t *testing.T) {
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t.Parallel()
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count := 50000
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@ -15,8 +15,13 @@ import (
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)
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var (
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mimeDecoder mime.WordDecoder
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mimeDecoder mime.WordDecoder
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// priorityHeaderIgnoreRegex matches specific patterns of the "Priority" header (RFC 9218), so that it can be ignored
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priorityHeaderIgnoreRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^u=\d,\s*(i|\d)$|^u=\d$`)
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// forwardedHeaderRegex parses IPv4 addresses from the "Forwarded" header (RFC 7239)
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forwardedHeaderRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bfor="?(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})"?`)
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)
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func readBoolParam(r *http.Request, defaultValue bool, names ...string) bool {
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@ -35,15 +40,11 @@ func toBool(value string) bool {
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return value == "1" || value == "yes" || value == "true"
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}
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func readCommaSeparatedParam(r *http.Request, names ...string) (params []string) {
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paramStr := readParam(r, names...)
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if paramStr != "" {
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params = make([]string, 0)
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for _, s := range util.SplitNoEmpty(paramStr, ",") {
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params = append(params, strings.TrimSpace(s))
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}
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func readCommaSeparatedParam(r *http.Request, names ...string) []string {
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if paramStr := readParam(r, names...); paramStr != "" {
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return util.Map(util.SplitNoEmpty(paramStr, ","), strings.TrimSpace)
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}
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return params
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return []string{}
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}
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func readParam(r *http.Request, names ...string) string {
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@ -74,6 +75,8 @@ func readQueryParam(r *http.Request, names ...string) string {
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return ""
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}
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// extractIPAddress extracts the IP address of the visitor from the request,
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// either from the TCP socket or from a proxy header.
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func extractIPAddress(r *http.Request, behindProxy bool, proxyForwardedHeader string, proxyTrustedAddresses []string) netip.Addr {
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if behindProxy && proxyForwardedHeader != "" {
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if addr, err := extractIPAddressFromHeader(r, proxyForwardedHeader, proxyTrustedAddresses); err == nil {
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@ -91,26 +94,39 @@ func extractIPAddress(r *http.Request, behindProxy bool, proxyForwardedHeader st
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// extractIPAddressFromHeader extracts the last IP address from the specified header.
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//
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// X-Forwarded-For can contain multiple addresses (see #328). If we are behind a proxy,
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// only the right-most address can be trusted (as this is the one added by our proxy server).
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// It supports multiple formats:
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// - single IP address
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// - comma-separated list
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// - RFC 7239-style list (Forwarded header)
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//
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// If there are multiple addresses, we first remove the trusted IP addresses from the list, and
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// then take the right-most address in the list (as this is the one added by our proxy server).
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// See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Forwarded-For for details.
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func extractIPAddressFromHeader(r *http.Request, forwardedHeader string, trustedAddresses []string) (netip.Addr, error) {
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value := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get(forwardedHeader))
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value := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(r.Header.Get(forwardedHeader)))
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if value == "" {
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return netip.IPv4Unspecified(), fmt.Errorf("no %s header found", forwardedHeader)
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}
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addrs := util.Map(util.SplitNoEmpty(value, ","), strings.TrimSpace)
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clientAddrs := util.Filter(addrs, func(addr string) bool {
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return !slices.Contains(trustedAddresses, addr)
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// Extract valid addresses
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addrsStrs := util.Map(util.SplitNoEmpty(value, ","), strings.TrimSpace)
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var validAddrs []netip.Addr
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for _, addrStr := range addrsStrs {
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if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(addrStr); err == nil {
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validAddrs = append(validAddrs, addr)
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} else if m := forwardedHeaderRegex.FindStringSubmatch(addrStr); len(m) == 2 {
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if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(m[1]); err == nil {
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validAddrs = append(validAddrs, addr)
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}
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}
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}
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// Filter out proxy addresses
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clientAddrs := util.Filter(validAddrs, func(addr netip.Addr) bool {
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return !slices.Contains(trustedAddresses, addr.String())
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})
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if len(clientAddrs) == 0 {
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return netip.IPv4Unspecified(), fmt.Errorf("no client IP address found in %s header: %s", forwardedHeader, value)
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}
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clientAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(clientAddrs[len(clientAddrs)-1])
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if err != nil {
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return netip.IPv4Unspecified(), fmt.Errorf("invalid IP address %s received in %s header: %s: %w", clientAddr, forwardedHeader, value, err)
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}
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return clientAddr, nil
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return clientAddrs[len(clientAddrs)-1], nil
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}
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func readJSONWithLimit[T any](r io.ReadCloser, limit int, allowEmpty bool) (*T, error) {
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@ -143,7 +159,7 @@ func fromContext[T any](r *http.Request, key contextKey) (T, error) {
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// maybeDecodeHeader decodes the given header value if it is MIME encoded, e.g. "=?utf-8?q?Hello_World?=",
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// or returns the original header value if it is not MIME encoded. It also calls maybeIgnoreSpecialHeader
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// to ignore new HTTP "Priority" header.
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// to ignore the new HTTP "Priority" header.
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func maybeDecodeHeader(name, value string) string {
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decoded, err := mimeDecoder.DecodeHeader(value)
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if err != nil {
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@ -152,7 +168,7 @@ func maybeDecodeHeader(name, value string) string {
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return maybeIgnoreSpecialHeader(name, decoded)
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}
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// maybeIgnoreSpecialHeader ignores new HTTP "Priority" header (see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-priority)
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// maybeIgnoreSpecialHeader ignores the new HTTP "Priority" header (RFC 9218, see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9218)
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//
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// Cloudflare (and potentially other providers) add this to requests when forwarding to the backend (ntfy),
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// so we just ignore it. If the "Priority" header is set to "u=*, i" or "u=*" (by Cloudflare), the header will be ignored.
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@ -95,12 +95,14 @@ func TestExtractIPAddress(t *testing.T) {
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r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", " 1.2.3.4 , 5.6.7.8")
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r.Header.Set("X-Client-IP", "9.10.11.12")
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r.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", "13.14.15.16, 1.1.1.1")
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r.Header.Set("Forwarded", "for=17.18.19.20;by=proxy.example.com, by=2.2.2.2;for=1.1.1.1")
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trustedProxies := []string{"1.1.1.1"}
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require.Equal(t, "5.6.7.8", extractIPAddress(r, true, "X-Forwarded-For", trustedProxies).String())
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require.Equal(t, "9.10.11.12", extractIPAddress(r, true, "X-Client-IP", trustedProxies).String())
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require.Equal(t, "13.14.15.16", extractIPAddress(r, true, "X-Real-IP", trustedProxies).String())
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require.Equal(t, "17.18.19.20", extractIPAddress(r, true, "Forwarded", trustedProxies).String())
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require.Equal(t, "10.0.0.1", extractIPAddress(r, false, "X-Forwarded-For", trustedProxies).String())
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}
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@ -108,9 +110,11 @@ func TestExtractIPAddress_UnixSocket(t *testing.T) {
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r, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://ntfy.sh/mytopic/json?since=all", nil)
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r.RemoteAddr = "@"
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r.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "1.2.3.4, 5.6.7.8, 1.1.1.1")
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r.Header.Set("Forwarded", "by=bla.example.com;for=17.18.19.20")
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trustedProxies := []string{"1.1.1.1"}
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require.Equal(t, "5.6.7.8", extractIPAddress(r, true, "X-Forwarded-For", trustedProxies).String())
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require.Equal(t, "17.18.19.20", extractIPAddress(r, true, "Forwarded", trustedProxies).String())
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require.Equal(t, "0.0.0.0", extractIPAddress(r, false, "X-Forwarded-For", trustedProxies).String())
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}
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